SummaryIt is shown that the concept of understanding cannot be reduced to a combination of knowing that, knowing how, and knowledge by acquaintence. First, it is shown that understanding and knowledge have different objects. Then “understanding what” is analyzed along Aristotelian lines. In the central part of the paper it is shown that understanding objects defined by constitutive rules involves a non‐propositional component. This notion of “understanding” is shown to cut across the humanist‐scientist dichotomy.

Aristotle and the sea battle, by G. E. M. Anscombe.--Aristotle's different possibilities, by K. J. J. Hintikka.--On Aristotle's square of opposition, by M. Thompson.--Categories in Aristotle and in Kant, by J. C. Wilson.--Aristotle's Categories, chapters I-V: translation and notes, by J. L. Ackrill--Aristotle's theory of categories, by J. M. E. Moravcsik.--Essence and accident, by I. M. Copi.--Tithenai ta phainomena, by G. E. L. Owen.--Matter and predication in Aristotle, by J. Owens.--Problems in Metaphysics Z, chapter 13, by M. J. Woods.--The meaning (...) of agathon in the Ethics of Aristotle, by H. A. Prichard.--Agathon and eudaimonia in the Ethics of Aristotle, by J. L. Austin.--The final good in Aristotle's Ethics, by W. F. R. Hardie.--Aristotle on pleasure, by J. O. Urmson.--Bibliography (p. 335-41). (shrink)

Language, Duty, and Value Jonathan Dancy, J. M. E. Moravcsik James Opie Urmson, Edited by Jonathan Dancy, J. M. E. Moravcsik, and C. C. W. Taylor. reasons in general. This is freedom in the sense of acting on reasons, yet not those ...

SummaryWe need to classify emotions as objectual and non‐objectual. Some of the objectual emotions are dependent on the characterizations of their objects. So in these cases reason guides the emotions. But there are also other cases in which the conceptual dependency goes the other way. in the case of aesthetic judgments and certain types of judgments involving purpose, or compassion, the ability to make these judgments is dependent on being in certain emotional states. Thus in some cases emotions aid and (...) supplement reason.RésuméNous devons classer les émotions comme objectuelles et non objectuelles. Quelques‐unes des émotions objectuelles sont dépendantes des caractéristiques de leurs objets. La raison guide alors les émotions. Mais il y a aussi des cas ou la dépendance conceptuelle suit ?on;autres voies. Dans le cas de jugements esthétiques et de jugements comportant des buts, ou de la compassion, la capacityé de porter ces jugements est dépendante de certains états émotionnels dans lesquels se trouve le sujet. Ainsi, dans certains cas, les émotions aident et completent la raison.ZusammenfassungWir müssen die Gefühle in objektuelle und nicht‐objektuelle einteilen. Einige der objektuellen Gefühle sind von der Charakterisierung ihrer Objekte abhängig. In diesen Fällen lenkt die Vernunft die Gefühle. Es gibt aber auch Fälle, in welchen die begriffliche Abhängigkeit umgekehrt verläuft. Im Falle von ästhetischen Urteilen und von gewissen Urteilen, die Zwecke oder Mitgefühle betreffen, hängt die Fähigkeit, solche Urteile zu fällen, davon ab, dass man sich in bestimmten Gemütszuständen befindet. So kommt es, dass in einigen Fällen Gefühle die Vernunft unterstützen und ergänzen. (shrink)

The questions that occupied early Ionian philosophers are very general in nature, and are not linked to the various skills and crafts that surface early in Greek civilization. The awe and wonder fuelling these questions were directed towards large scale phenomena, and—according to the interpretation presented in this essay—called for more than mere re-descriptions or re-labellings of various features of reality. They called for explanations, but the notion of an intellectually adequate explanation took a long time to develop. Conceptions of (...) adequate explanation were changing throughout Pre-Socratic philosophy. It was left to Aristotle to attempt to capture the various models, and give them a unifying structure within an explicit theory. (shrink)

The essays in this volume explore current work in central areas of philosophy, work unified by attention to salient questions of human action and human agency. They ask what it is for humans to act knowledgeably, to use language, to be friends, to act heroically, to be mortally fortunate, and to produce as well as to appreciate art. The volume is dedicated to J. O. Urmson, in recognition of his inspirational contributions to these areas. All the essays but one have (...) been specially written for this volume. (shrink)

Book reviewed in this article:Noam Chomsky, New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind.

The main claim of this paper is that Plato's views on social and individual good as well as his criticism of democracy can be best understood as a conscious attempt to contrast with Periclean conceptions of freedom and democracy a new point of view. It will be argued that it is a mistake to see Plato's view as either democratic or authoritarian. An adequate understanding of Plato will focus on some difficult questions concerning the relationship between freedom and knowledge; questions (...) that are rarely if ever faced clearly today. The Platonic conception and its clash with Pericles raises also some important and still unresolved questions about human motivation. (shrink)

The main claim of this paper is that Plato's views on social and individual good as well as his criticism of democracy can be best understood as a conscious attempt to contrast with Periclean conceptions of freedom and democracy a new point of view. It will be argued that it is a mistake to see Plato's view as either democratic or authoritarian. An adequate understanding of Plato will focus on some difficult questions concerning the relationship between freedom and knowledge; questions (...) that are rarely if ever faced clearly today. The Platonic conception and its clash with Pericles raises also some important and still unresolved questions about human motivation. (shrink)

SummaryIn this paper the apparent disagreement between Kripke and Frege on the analysis of singular terms is analyzed. It is shown that Frege's theory is basically an analysis of belief, while Kripke's theory is basically an analysis of metaphysical and causal contexts. Tentative arguments are presented for showing that these two types of contexts require different analysis, thus neither Kripke nor Frege can be said to have developed a theory handling all opaque contexts.